In Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), the Montana Department of Revenue sought to distinguish that case from the Supreme Court’s Trinity Lutheran decision a few years earlier by arguing that “Trinity Lutheran does not govern here because the no-aid provision applies not because of the religious character of the recipients, but because of how the funds would be used—for ‘religious education.’” Id. at 2255. But the Supreme Court rejected that argument. Why did it reject that argument?
(Scroll down for the answer)
Answer: The reason is because the Espinoza case “turns expressly on religious status and not religious use.” Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (2020) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to note that “Status-based discrimination remains status based even if one of its goals or effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.” Id.
Here is a bit more extensive quote from the decision to help put it more in perspective:
This case also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use. The Montana Supreme Court applied the no-aid provision solely by reference to religious status. The Court repeatedly explained that the no-aid provision bars aid to “schools controlled in whole or in part by churches,” “sectarian schools,” and “religiously-affiliated schools.” 393 Mont. at 463–467, 435 P.3d at 611–613. Applying this provision to the scholarship program, the Montana Supreme Court noted that most of the private schools that would benefit from the program were “religiously affiliated” and “controlled by churches,” and the Court ultimately concluded that the scholarship program ran afoul of the Montana Constitution by aiding “schools controlled by churches.” Id., at 466–467, 435 P.3d at 613–614. The Montana Constitution discriminates based on religious status just like the Missouri policy in Trinity Lutheran, which excluded organizations “owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.” 582 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 2017.
The Department points to some language in the decision below indicating that the no-aid provision has the goal or effect of ensuring that government aid does not end up being used for “sectarian education” or “religious education.” 393 Mont. at 460, 466–467, 435 P.3d at 609, 613–614. The Department also contrasts what it characterizes as the “completely non-religious” benefit of playground resurfacing in Trinity Lutheran with the unrestricted tuition aid at issue here. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. General school aid, the Department stresses, could be used for religious ends by some recipients, particularly schools that believe faith should “permeate[ ]” everything they do. Brief for Respondents 39 (quoting State ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10, 155 Mont. 422, 438, 472 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1970)). See also post, at 2285, 2288 (BREYER, J., dissenting).
Regardless, those considerations were not the Montana Supreme Court's basis for applying the no-aid provision to exclude religious schools; that hinged solely on religious status. Status-based discrimination remains status based even if one of its goals or effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.
Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256, 207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2020)
Disclaimer: The Religion Law Quizzes are provided as a service to you. They are intended only for educational purposes. Nothing in the Quizzes is intended to be legal advice and they should not be relied upon as conclusive on any issue discussed therein.
HERE IS AN AI GENERATED SUMMARY OF TODAY’S PODCAST
Welcome to another insightful episode of the Religion Law Podcast, where host Michael Fielding sheds light on religious freedoms and other religion law-related topics. Diving into The Supreme Court's ruling on religious bias, this episode centers around episode number 78, where a law case, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, becomes the primary subject of discussion.
Detailed in the Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue case, the Montana Department of Revenue had ruled that students who partake in private religious-affiliated schools are ineligible to participate in state scholarship programs. The intention behind it being that it would not be appropriate for state dollars, distributed as scholarships, to be given to students attending private religious schools. This, of course, was challenged by a private Christian school.
Taking context from a few years earlier, the Supreme Court’s decision on Trinity Lutheran was recalled, and to defend their stance, Montana had to differentiate the Espinoza scenario from the Trinity Lutheran case. Their basis for contrast was, stated in quote: "Trinity Lutheran does not govern here because the no-aid provision applies not because of the religious character of the recipients, but because of how the funds would be used for religious education." The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument.
Fielding delves into the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s ruling, explaining how the Espinoza case turned expressly on religious status and not religious use. He highlights the Supreme Court's strong condemnation of status-based discrimination, and how they view it as inconsistent with the Constitution, in any circumstance where a generally applicable government program is in place.
Join us in this significant exploration of the Supreme Court's stance against religion-based discrimination, their rationale, and its implications on a larger scale. Remember, these law discussions aim at enhancing your understanding of legal scenarios related to religious freedoms and are not intended for direct legal implementation. Share this episode, leave a review, and stay tuned for more engaging discussions, till we meet again!
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